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I. INTRODUCTION 
Within the last two years, legislation authorizing the 
incorporation of a new form of business corporation known as a 
“benefit corporation” has been signed into law in California,1 
Hawaii,2 Maryland,3 New Jersey,4 New York,5 Vermont,6 and 
Virginia.7  Similar legislation has been introduced in five other 
states,8 and legislation is also expected to be introduced within the 
next year in additional states as well. 
The distinctive features of a benefit corporation are: (1) it has 
a corporate purpose to create a material positive impact on society 
and the environment; (2) the duties of its directors are expanded 
 
 1. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14600–14631 (West 2011).   The California legislation 
was signed into law on October 9, 2011 and will become effective on January 1, 
2012.  
 2. S.B. 1462, 26th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2011).  The Hawaii legislation was 
signed into law on July 8, 2011 (at the time of publication, an effective date was 
not yet identifiable).  The Hawaii legislation refers to the new form of corporation 
as a “sustainable business corporation” instead of as a “benefit corporation,” but 
the provisions of the legislation are substantively similar to the legislation enacted 
in the other states. 
 3. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-01 (West 2011).  The Maryland 
legislation was signed into law on April 13, 2010 and became effective on October 
1, 2010. 
 4. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:18-1 to -11 (West 2011).  The New Jersey legislation 
passed on January 10, 2011 and became effective when it was signed into law on 
March 1, 2011. 
 5. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1701–1709 (Consol. 2011).  The New York 
legislation was signed into law on December 12, 2011 and will become effective on 
February 10, 2012. 
 6. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.02 (2011).  The Vermont legislation was 
signed into law on May 19, 2010 and became effective on July 1, 2011. 
 7. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (2011).  The Virginia legislation was signed into 
law on March 26, 2011 and became effective on July 1, 2011. 
 8. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180 / 1-26 (2010); S.B. 5, 68th Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Colo. 2011); S.B. 360, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011); S.B. 26, Gen. 
Assemb., Sess. 2011 (N.C. 2011); H.B. 1616, 195th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 
2011); H.B. 1578, 195th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2011); S.B. 433 195th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2011). 
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss2/8
  
2012] BENEFIT CORPORATIONS 819 
to require consideration of interests in addition to the financial 
interest of its shareholders; and (3) it is required to report each 
year on its overall social and environmental performance using a 
comprehensive, credible, independent, and transparent third-party 
standard.9 
It should be noted at the outset that the topic of the issue of 
the Law Review in which this article appearsbusiness 
organizations lacking a “business purpose”does not strictly apply 
to benefit corporations, which are the subject of this article.  
Benefit corporations are business organizations, but they are not 
lacking a business purpose.  Instead, they have a business purpose 
that has been redefined.  Like other business corporations, a 
benefit corporation is intended to make a profit for its 
shareholders, but the way in which that profit is to be made is 
through the conduct of business in a socially and environmentally 
responsible way.  Before discussing in detail how benefit 
corporations are redefining the business purpose of business 
corporations, this article first describes the forces that have led to 
the development of the benefit corporation form and the 
traditional legal framework of business corporations against which 
the benefit corporation form has been developed. 
II. MARKET DEMAND BY CONSUMERS, INVESTORS, AND SOCIAL 
ENTREPRENEURS 
For-profit social entrepreneurship, social investing, and the 
sustainable business movement have reached critical mass and are 
now at an inflection point.  Accelerating consumer and investor 
demand has resulted in the formation of a substantial marketplace 
for companies that are using the power of business to solve social 
problems. 
A. Consumers 
A significant and growing population of consumers already 
aligns its purchases with its values, and many more have become 
conscious of the issue.  Approximately 68 million U.S. consumers 
have stated a preference for making purchasing decisions based 
 
 9. Benefit CorporationLegal Provisions and FAQs, BCORPORATION.NET, 1, 
http://www.bcorporation.net/resources/bcorp/documents/Benefit%20Corporat
ion%20-%20Legal%20Provisions%20and%20FAQ.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2011) 
[hereinafter Benefit Corporation]. 
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upon their sense of social and environmental responsibility.10  
Some consumers use their purchasing power to punish companies 
for negative corporate behavior,11 and many other consumers use 
their purchasing power to reward companies that positively address 
a social or environmental issue.  Current surveys have shown that 
forty-nine percent of Americans have boycotted companies whose 
behavior they perceive is not in the best interest of society.12  
Meanwhile, recent research has also indicated that where price and 
quality are equal, eighty-seven percent of consumers would switch 
from their current brand to a brand that is socially responsible.13  
These consumer behaviors apply not just to purchases related to 
popular consumer products, but also to many other industries, 
including telecommunications, banking, and professional services 
(e.g., law firms).14 
As consumer demand for socially responsible products and 
companies is increasing, consumer trust in corporations is 
decreasing.  Marketers use the terms “green,” “responsible,” 
“sustainable,” “charitable,” and words like them on a daily basis to 
describe their products or their companies.  However, the more 
these terms are used, the less meaning they have because there are 
no standards to back up the claims.15  This problem, often referred 
 
 10. Benefits of Becoming a Sustainable Business, ECO-OFFICIENCY, http://www.eco-
officiency.com/benefits_becoming_sustainable_business.html (last visited Oct. 27, 
2011). 
 11. See, e.g., LAWRENCE B. GLICKMAN, BUYING POWER: A HISTORY OF CONSUMER 
ACTIVISM IN AMERICA (2009) (tracing the history of boycotts in the United States 
from the American Revolution through the 1970s); Steven E. Levingston, Whole 
Foods Boycott: The Long View, WASH. POST SHORT STACK BLOG (Sept. 2, 2009, 5:30 
AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/shortstack/2009/09/whole_foods 
_boycott_the_long_v.html?hpid=news-col-blog (introducing guest blogger 
Lawrence Glickman, who argues consumer boycotts have been used throughout 
American history but have not always been successful). 
 12. Sheila M. J. Bonini et al., The Trust Gap Between Consumers and Corporations, 
MCKINSEY Q., no. 2, 2007 at 7, 10. 
 13. CONE LLC, 2007 CONE CAUSE EVOLUTION AND ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEY 8 
(2007), available at http://www.coneinc.com/files/2007ConeSurveyReport.pdf. 
 14. CONE LLC, 2010 CONE CAUSE EVOLUTION STUDY 10 (2010), available at 
http://www.coneinc.com/files/2010-Cone-Cause-Evolution-Study.pdf. 
 15. For example, Exxon Mobile was named “Green Company of the Year” by 
Forbes Magazine in 2009 for its focus on natural gas (as opposed to coal).  
Christopher Helman, ExxonMobil: Green Company of the Year, FORBES (Aug. 24, 
2009), available at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/0824/Energy-oil-
exxonmobil-green-company-of-year.html.  However, the Forbes article failed to 
assess its performance on other environmental issues, such as its lobbying against 
climate change or even the negative effects of natural gas on the environment.  
Josh Harkinson, Exxon Mobil: “Green Company of the Year?”, MOTHER JONES, Aug. 27, 
4
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to as “greenwashing,” is misleading for consumers and frustrating 
for businesses that try to distinguish themselves based on their 
social and environmental business practices. Consumers are less 
likely to trust the company’s claims versus consumer reports or 
third-party certifications.16  As a result, various certifications, such as 
“Organic,” “Fair Trade,” “Energy Star,” “Green seal,” “LEED,” and 
“Forest Stewardship Council,” have emerged to provide insight on 
particular aspects of a certain company’s social or environmental 
performance.17  Although there has been a proliferation of narrow 
product or practice-specific standards like those mentioned, there 
are fewer standards that provide a comprehensive understanding of 
a company’s performance as a whole.  The lack of comprehensive 
and transparent standards is making it difficult for a consumer to 
tell the difference between a “good company” and just good 
marketing. 
This general public preference for supporting “good 
companies” is not limited to purchases.  Consumers not only prefer 
to purchase from, but also to work for, companies who are 
committed to social and environmental issues.  More than two-
thirds of employees (sixty-nine percent) consider the social and 
environmental track record of the company in deciding where to 
work.18  This preference is especially strong among Masters in 
Business Administration (“MBA”) graduates, who overwhelmingly 
(eighty-eight percent) have said that they would be comfortable 
taking a pay cut to work for a company that has ethical business 
practices versus one that does not.19 
 
2009, http://motherjones.com/blue-marble/2009/08/exxonmobil-green 
-company-year-0.  In the United Kingdom, Exxon advertisements claiming to be 
“eco-friendly” for its natural gas projects were banned as misleading in 2008.  John 
Plunkett, ExxonMobil to Contest Ban on Ad for Liquefied Natural Gas, THE GUARDIAN, 
Sept. 3, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2008/sep/03/asa.advertising. 
 16. See BBMG, CONSCIOUS CONSUMER REPORT: REDEFINING VALUE IN A NEW 
ECONOMY 16 (2009). 
 17. For a description of these and other symbols, see Guide to Green Symbols, 
EASY WAYS TO GO GREEN (Apr. 27, 2008), http://www.easywaystogogreen.com 
/green-guides/guide-to-green-symbols/.  
 18. CONE LLC, 2010 CONE CAUSE EVOLUTION STUDY 8 (2010), available at 
http://www.coneinc.com/files/2010-Cone-Cause-Evolution-Study.pdf. 
 19. New MBAs Would Sacrifice Pay for Ethics, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 17, 2011), 
http://web.hbr.org/email/archive/dailystat.php?date=051711.  The average pay 
cut the MBA students would accept to work for a responsible business is about 
$8,000.  Id.  
5
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B. Investors 
The socially responsible investing (“SRI”) movement has 
grown over the past thirty years to represent nearly ten percent of 
U.S. assets under management, or roughly $2.3 trillion.20  SRI has 
evolved in both the public and private markets, becoming an 
institutionalized sector of the professional asset management 
market and giving rise to a distinct venture capital and private 
equity industry of funds and individual investors seeking value-
aligned investment opportunities. 
Some SRI investors use screens to avoid “sin” (e.g., tobacco, 
alcohol, gaming) and weapons stocks or to reward social or 
environmental “best in class” companies in each industry sector in 
their portfolio.  Other SRI investors engage corporations to change 
their behaviors through shareholder resolutions or other forms of 
activism; and still others increasingly being called impact investors, 
seek to create more direct social impact through targeted direct 
equity and debt investments in businesses such as community 
banks, microfinance institutions, clean- or green-tech businesses, or 
social venture funds investing globally across developed and 
emerging markets.21 
A November 2010 report by J.P. Morgan titled “Impact 
Investments: An Emerging Asset Class” estimates the size of this 
market opportunity to be between $400 billion and $1 trillion.22  
This estimate only included investment opportunities in emerging 
markets across five sectors: housing, rural water delivery, maternal 
health, primary education, and financial services.23  J.P. Morgan 
estimates the ten-year profit potential from these opportunities 
 
 20. SOC. INV. FORUM, 2010 REPORT ON SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (2010), available at http://ussif.org/resources/research 
/documents/2010TrendsES.pdf; see also Socially Responsible Investing Facts, US SIF, 
http://ussif.org/resources/sriguide/srifacts.cfm (last visited Oct. 27, 2011). 
 21. See Socially Responsible Investing Facts, supra note 20 (highlighting 
screening, shareholder advocacy, and community investing as typical investor 
approaches).  
 22. J.P. MORGAN GLOBAL RESEARCH, IMPACT INVESTMENTS: AN EMERGING ASSET 
CLASS 6 (2010), available at http://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/BlobServer 
/impact_investments_nov2010.pdf?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blob
key=id&blobwhere=1158611333228&blobheader=application%2Fpdf; see also 
Nicholas Timmons, Impact investment ‘a burgeoning asset class’, FT.COM (Nov. 28, 
2010, 6:02 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e875dda6-fae6-11df-b576-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1g181ezBS (summarizing the J.P. Morgan report).  
 23. J.P. MORGAN GLOBAL RESEARCH, supra note 22, at 6. 
6
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alone ranged between $183 billion and $667 billion.24  Coming at it 
from the demand side of the equation and focused only on 
individual U.S. investors, a June 2010 “Money for Good” report 
from Hope Consulting estimates a demand for impact investments 
among U.S. high net worth individuals at $120 billion.25 
Like consumers, investors lack the comprehensive tools to 
understand the complete picture of a company’s performance 
across the full range of social and environmental measures.  
Likewise, businesses may have a hard time attracting investors by 
distinguishing themselves among the sea of companies that claim 
to be “socially responsible.”  Furthermore, the current trend, 
particularly in the public capital markets and among policy makers 
and large public corporations serious about sustainability, is to 
encourage integrated sustainability reporting using credible third-
party standards.  According to Institutional Shareholder Services 
(“ISS”), the largest shareholder proxy organization in the world, 
this trend is also true for institutional investors who “appear to be 
increasingly incorporating social and environmental considerations 
into their proxy voting decisions, as demonstrated by voting trends 
and institutional investor initiatives.”26  
C. Entrepreneurs 
For-profit social entrepreneurs have gained increasing 
prominence on the business landscape.  Probably the highest 
profile example of this has been the awarding of the Nobel Peace 
Prize to Muhammad Yunus for his pioneering work in 
microfinance, but there are many other examples.27  Although 
there is no reliable data on “social enterprise” company revenues, 
an aggregation of businesses belonging to membership associations 
generally identified with the sustainable business movement reveals 
a marketplace of over 30,000 social entrepreneurs with over $40 
 
 24. Id.  
 25. HOPE CONSULTING, MONEY FOR GOOD 10 (May 2010), available at 
http://www.hopeconsulting.us/pdf/Money%20for%20Good_Final.pdf. 
 26. CAROLYN MATHIASEN & ERIK MELL, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, 
CORPORATE SOCIAL ISSUES: A 2011 PROXY SEASON PREVIEW (2011), available at 
http://www.issgovernance.com/docs/2011ESGPreview. 
 27. Muhammad Yunus is known as a “banker to the poor” and won the Nobel 
Prize in 2006 for his work with the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh.  See Muhammad 
Yunus Biography, NOBELPRIZE.ORG (2006), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel 
_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/yunus-bio.html, for a biography of Muhammad 
Yunus and information regarding his work. 
7
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billion in revenues.28  
The pipeline of future for-profit social entrepreneurs is filling 
rapidly as most top business schools offer a program in Social 
Entrepreneurship.29  The membership of Net Impact, a network of 
business school students and young professionals using business as 
a tool for social change, is over 20,000 people in 280 chapters 
globally.30  There are numerous additional companies that do not 
self-identify as “socially responsible,” but nevertheless behave that 
way, and there are other sectors of the economy such as health 
care, education, housing, food, agriculture, and consumer 
products with concentrations of high-impact businesses. 
The current marketplace, however, continues to be 
fragmented and confusing.  As noted above, entrepreneurs that are 
“sustainable,” “green,” or “socially responsible” may find that it is 
hard to distinguish themselves from other companies that make 
similar claims, but do not actually behave as they advertise.  
Furthermore, the current legal framework is structured to ensure 
profit maximization, not social responsibility.31  Because of this, 
entrepreneurs with a mission-driven business may be reluctant to 
accept outside capital from investors who may not share their long-
term vision for social and environmental responsibility.   
 
 28. Stacy Perman, Making a Profit and a Difference, BUSINESSWEEK, Apr. 3, 2009,  
http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/mar2009/sb20090330_541747.h
tm.  A partial listing of these associations includes: Green America, Social Venture 
Network, Investors Circle, Business Alliance for Local Living Economies, Transfair 
USA, Social Investment Forum, National Cooperative Business Association, and 
the National Center for Employee Ownership. 
 29. For example, Duke University’s Fuqua School of Business has the Center 
for the Advancement of Social Entrepreneurship, the University of Pennsylvania’s 
Wharton School of Business touts several social entrepreneurship programs, 
including the Social Enterprise Fellowship Program, and Northwestern 
University’s Kellogg School of Management provides the Carol and Larry Levy 
Social Entrepreneurship Lab.  
 30. See About Us, NET IMPACT (last visited Dec. 9, 2011), 
http://netimpact.org/about; see also Connect with Members, NET IMPACT (last visited 
Dec. 9, 2011), http://netimpact.org/connect. 
 31. See A.L.I., 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 2.01 (1994), for a 
discussion of the objective and conduct of a corporation generally (noting that a 
business corporation should have as its objective the conduct of such activities with 
a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain, but that its pursuit of 
the economic objective must be constrained by social imperatives and may be 
qualified by social needs). 
8
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III. EXISTING CORPORATION LAW DOES NOT ACCOMMODATE FOR-
PROFIT, MISSION-DRIVEN COMPANIES 
A. Background 
The notion that a business corporation has as its purpose 
creating financial gain for its shareholders, was forcefully 
articulated by the Michigan Supreme Court almost 100 years ago in 
the following statement in Dodge v. Ford: 
A business corporation is organized and carried on 
primarily for the profit of the stockholders.  The powers 
of the directors are to be employed for that end.  The 
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of 
means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change 
in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the 
nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to 
devote them to other purposes.32 
Dodge v. Ford does not stand alone, and cases in other 
jurisdictions have reiterated the shareholder maximization duty 
that “[i]t is the obligation of directors to attempt, within the law, to 
maximize the long-run interests of the corporation’s 
stockholders.”33  Though still a staple in many law school 
casebooks, some commentators have suggested that the decision in 
Dodge v. Ford to award the shareholders a special dividend was not 
based on shareholder wealth maximization principles, but rather a 
breach of duty of good faith to minority shareholders “by 
withholding special dividends to perhaps freeze them out.”34  A 
strict reading of Dodge v. Ford and other cases that specify 
shareholder wealth maximization as a fiduciary duty has been 
criticized by those who believe that these cases do not represent the 
current state of modern corporate law.35  Nevertheless, Dodge v. Ford 
 
 32. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
 33. Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986); see also Long v. 
Norwood Hills Corp., 380 S.W.2d 451, 475–76 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); Granada Invs., 
Inc. v. DWG Corp., 823 F. Supp. 448, 459 (N.D. Ohio 1993).  
 34. Judd F. Sneirson, Green is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a New 
Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987, 1001–07 (2009) 
[hereinafter Green is Good] (noting that Dodge v. Ford has only been cited by 
Delaware three times, twice as authority for the close corporation issue, and 
arguing that it should not be taught as a case of precedential value with respect to 
a duty of shareholder maximization).  
 35. Id. at 1003–04 (describing three other cases that clearly identify a duty of 
shareholder maximization of value, but dismissing the precedential value of these 
cases on that point and noting that they are rarely cited for that proposition).  But 
9
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remains good law and many still maintain that its “theory of 
shareholder wealth maximization has been widely accepted by 
courts over an extended period of time.”36 
The American Law Institute (“ALI”) takes a moderated view 
on the role of shareholder wealth maximization.37  Section 2.01 of 
the ALI’s Principles of Corporate Governance provides:  
(a) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (b) . . . , a 
corporation . . . should have as its objective the conduct of 
business activities with a view to enhancing corporate 
profit and shareholder gain. 
(b) Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not 
thereby enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct of its 
business: 
(1) Is obliged, to the same extent as a natural person, 
to act within the boundaries set by law; 
(2) May take into account ethical considerations that 
are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the 
responsible conduct of business; and 
(3) May devote a reasonable amount of resources to 
public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and 
philanthropic purposes.38 
Although the ALI approach permits the consideration of ethical 
issues and the devotion of resources to certain non-business 
purposes, these provisions are qualified by limits for 
“reasonableness” and “appropriateness.”39  The primary focus is 
clearly still on corporate profit and shareholder gain. 
The case eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark40 has recently 
reaffirmed the primacy of wealth maximization.  The case involved 
a dispute between unlikely business partners: Craig Newmark and 
James Buckmaster, the majority shareholders and directors of the 
 
see STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS §§ 1.4(b), 9.2, 9.3, 
at 411–13 (2002); Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on 
Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 177, 190 (2008) (stating that the shareholder 
maximization ideal in Dodge v. Ford actually drives the holding and is not mere 
dicta).  
 36. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 35, § 9.2, at 413 (accepting the theory of 
shareholder maximization expressed in Dodge v. Ford); see also Macey, supra note 
35, at 180 (“[S]hareholder wealth maximization is widely accepted at the level of 
rhetoric.”). 
 37. A.L.I., 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE, supra note 31, § 2.01. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. § 2.01(b). 
 40. 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).   
10
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online auction site known as craigslist, and eBay, the online auction 
website.41  Although a for-profit corporation, craigslist operates its 
business largely as a community service, allowing users to post 
classified advertisements free of charge.42  The company does not 
sell advertising on its website to third parties, nor does it actively 
advertise or market its services.43  The sole revenue stream comes 
from fees for online job posting in certain cities and apartment 
listings in New York City.44  Although very successful, especially in 
terms of market share (craigslist is the leader for online classifieds), 
the site has not focused on “monetization,” and thus operates at a 
level that most competitors would not consider to be minimally 
acceptable.45  With only thirty-four employees, craigslist is a rather 
small operation.46  In contrast, eBay, a large publicly traded 
company, has a sophisticated business model and operates its 
business with the goal of maximizing revenues, profits, and market 
share.47  eBay has fully monetized its website, charging customers a 
commission on each sale, and has focused on expansion and 
market share through acquisitions and by actively advertising its 
services.48  Despite the differences between the two companies, 
eBay made an investment in craigslist and became a minority 
shareholder of craigslist, and was able to appoint a director to the 
board.49   
A dispute arose when it became apparent that eBay had 
invested in craigslist with an eye toward forming an international 
partnership and eventually making the company a subsidiary of 
eBay.50  Jim and Craig, who were opposed to the monetization of 
the site and preferred to keep its unique culture and community 
service roots, responded by taking certain defensive measures, 
including adopting a rights plan.51  eBay sued, alleging that Jim and 
 
 41. Id. at 6. 
 42. Id. at 8. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 9. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 11. 
 50. Id. at 14–16. 
 51. Id. at 21.  The board also adopted a staggered board and a right of first 
refusal/dilutive issuance; however, these measures were upheld and are thus not 
relevant to this discussion.  Id. 
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Craig violated their duties as directors and majority stockholders.52  
The court reviewed the decision to adopt the plan under Unocal’s 
intermediary standard, as described below, which requires that a 
defensive mechanism be in response to a properly and reasonably 
perceived threat to corporate policy and effectiveness, and that the 
mechanism constitute a proper response to that threat.53 
Jim and Craig articulated the following threat: after Jim and 
Craig die and their shares are distributed to their heirs, eBay’s 
acquisition of control “would fundamentally alter craigslist’s values, 
culture and business model, including departing from [craigslist’s] 
public-service mission in favor of increased monetization.”54  The 
court noted that the adoption of the rights plan was not reasonably 
related to the promotion of stockholder value, and admonished 
Jim and Craig for failing to prove that craigslist’s culture translates 
into increased profitability for stockholders.55  Like Dodge v. Ford, 
the eBay court provides a clear statement on the requirements with 
respect to shareholder wealth maximization: “Directors of a for-
profit Delaware corporation cannot deploy a [policy] . . . to defend 
a business strategy that openly eschews stockholder wealth 
maximization—at least not consistently with the directors’ fiduciary 
duties under Delaware law.”56  The court explained that “[h]aving 
chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors are 
bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that 
form . . . [including] acting to promote the value of the 
corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”57  This case, 
discussed in further detail below, reiterates the long-standing 
formulation of director duties and shows that current law views 
shareholder wealth maximization as a duty that directors are 
prohibited from abandoning.58 
B. Effect of Constituency Statutes 
Looking beyond case law, statutory law also informs the 
landscape of director duties with respect to shareholder wealth 
maximization.  Many states have adopted statutes that explicitly 
 
 52. Id. at 25. 
 53. Id. at 31. 
 54. Id. at 32. 
 55. Id. at 34. 
 56. Id. at 35. 
 57. Id. at 34. 
 58. Id.  
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allow directors to consider the interests of constituencies other 
than shareholders (called a “constituency statute”).  Constituency 
statutes may appear to change the paradigm of shareholder 
primacy; however, when viewed in context, this is not the case.  
Constituency statutes were developed mainly as a defensive 
mechanism for companies that are the subject of a hostile takeover, 
adopted to provide protection to a target company’s board by 
giving them the discretion to reject a hostile takeover based on its 
consideration of constituencies other than shareholders.59  With 
the increase of mission-driven and triple-bottom-line corporations, 
these constituency statutes are now being analyzed outside the 
context of a hostile takeover.60  However, as described below, even 
in states that have constituency statutes, the regime of shareholder 
primacy is still pervasive and the legal framework is not sufficient to 
meet the needs of new mission-driven and triple-bottom-line 
businesses. 
1. Constituency States 
The directors of companies incorporated in constituency 
statute states are expressly permitted by statute to consider persons 
other than shareholders in the discharge of their fiduciary duties.61  
Constituency statutes generally provide that, in fulfilling their 
fiduciary duties, directors may consider the effects of a decision not 
only on shareholders, but also on a list of other “constituency” 
 
 59. Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 
61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 24 (1992).  Many constituency provisions in state 
corporate statutes were enacted in response to takeover activity in the 1980s as a 
way to protect local businesses.  Id. at 23–26.  It is worth noting that these 
constituency statutes are permissive, i.e., they provide that the directors may 
consider the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders but are not 
required to do so.  See id. at 26–31 (discussing varieties of state constituency 
statutes). 
 60. See, e.g., Green is Good, supra note 34, at 997 (“[T]hese internal sources of 
corporate law generally leave such matters to the discretion of corporate boards 
and officers.  Boards and officers may strive for shareholder-wealth maximization 
or not, so long as they act according to external sources of corporate law, namely, 
corporate statutes and decisional law.”); Judd F. Sneirson, Race to the Left: A 
Legislator’s Guide to Greening a Corporate Code, 88 OR. L. REV. 491, 501 (2009) 
[hereinafter Race to the Left] (“[T]he law [in Oregon] only expressly permits 
corporate decision makers to consider the interests of nonshareholder 
constituencies like employees, customers, suppliers, and communities when 
evaluating the merits of a proposal to acquire the company.”). 
 61. See Orts, supra note 59, at 26–31.  
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groups.62  These permissible constituency groups vary state-by-state, 
but usually include employees, creditors, suppliers, consumers, and 
the community at large.63  Thirty-three states now have some 
version of a constituency statute.64  Conspicuously absent from the 
list of states adopting constituency statutes is Delaware, where more 
than 900,000 business entities have their legal home, including 
more than fifty percent of all U.S. publicly-traded companies and 
 
 62. See id. at 26.  These statutes provide an excuse for directors to reject 
hostile takeover situations.  See id. at 23–26.  These constituency statutes are 
permissive and do not require directors to consider the interests of stakeholders 
other than shareholders.  See id. at 26–31 (discussing varieties of state constituency 
statutes). 
 63. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 8.85 (2010) (stating directors “may . . . 
consider the effects of any action . . . upon employees, suppliers and customers of 
the corporation or its subsidiaries, communities in which offices or other 
establishments of the corporation or its subsidiaries are located, and all other 
pertinent factors”); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b)(2)(i)–(v) (Consol. 2011) 
(“[Directors] shall be entitled to consider . . . the effects that the corporation’s 
actions may have in the short-term or in the long-term upon any of the following: 
(i) the prospects for potential growth, development, productivity and profitability 
of the corporation; (ii) the corporation’s current employees; (iii) the 
corporation’s retired employees and other beneficiaries receiving or entitled to 
receive retirement, welfare or similar benefits from or pursuant to any plan 
sponsored, or agreement entered into, by the corporation; (iv) the corporation’s 
customers and creditors; and (v) the ability of the corporation to provide, as a 
going concern, goods, services, employment opportunities and employment 
benefits and otherwise to contribute to the communities in which it does 
business.”); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715(a)(1) (West 2011) (“[Directors may 
consider] [t]he effects of any action upon any or all groups affected by such 
action, including shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers and creditors of 
the corporation, and upon communities in which offices or other establishments 
of the corporation are located.”). 
 64. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-2702 (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-756(d) 
(2011); FLA. STAT. § 607.0830(3) (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (2011); 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 414-221(a)–(b) (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1602 (2010); 805 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 8.85 (2010); IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1(d) (2011); IOWA CODE § 
490.1108A (2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4) (LexisNexis 2011); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92(G) (2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 832 (2010); MD. 
CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-104(b)(9) (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156B, 
§ 65 (2010); MINN. STAT. § 302A.251(5) (2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30 
(2011); MO. REV. STAT. § 351.347(1) (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2432(2) (2010); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.138(4) (LexisNexis 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1(2) 
(West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (West 2011); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 
717(b) (Consol. 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(6) (2011); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 1701.59(E) (LexisNexis 2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357 (2009); 15 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 1715(a)(1) (West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8 (2010); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-103-204 (2011); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 11A, § 8.30 (2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-727.1 (2011); WIS. STAT. § 
180.0827 (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830(e) (2010). 
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sixty-three percent of the Fortune 500 companies.65  Most states, 
including those with constituency statutes, look to Delaware law 
when interpreting local corporate law.66 
While it is clear that directors of mission-driven companies 
incorporated in constituency statute jurisdictions may take into 
consideration the interests of various constituencies when 
exercising their business judgment, the lack of case law 
interpreting constituency statutes, coupled with the context in 
which many of these statutes were enacted, makes it difficult for 
directors to know exactly how, when, and to what extent they can 
consider those interests.67  For example, neither the constituency 
statutes themselves nor state case law address questions such as how 
directors should decide which parties fall within a protected 
constituency category, what weight the directors should assign to 
shareholder and non-shareholder interests, and what standards a 
court should use in reviewing directors’ decisions to consider (or 
not to consider) non-shareholder interests.  Based on the limited 
case law available, courts seem reluctant to wade into these issues 
and often fall back on shareholder primacy.68 
Without clear authority explicitly permitting directors to 
pursue both profit and a company’s mission, even directors of 
 
 65. 2010 Annual Report, DEL. DIV. OF CORPS. (Apr. 6, 2011), 
http://corp.delaware.gov/10CorpAR.pdf. 
 66. R. Cammon Turner, Shareholders vs. the World, 8 BUS. L. TODAY, Jan.–Feb. 
1999, at 32, 34, available at http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/8-
3shareholders.html. 
 67. For example, Jonathan Macey argues that constituency statutes do not 
change the legal landscape with respect to shareholder primacy.  However, Judd F. 
Sneirson argues the opposite.  In a 2008 article, Macey argues that “these 
[constituency] statutes cannot rationally be construed to permit managers to 
benefit non-shareholder constituencies at the expense of shareholders.  Rather, 
these statutes are mere tie-breakers, allowing managers to take the interests of 
non-shareholder constituencies into account when doing so does not harm 
shareholders in any demonstrable way.”  Macey, supra note 35, at 179.  Sneirson, 
on the other hand, states that constituency statutes “expressly permit decisions 
that elevate other, nonshareholder considerations . . . over the maximization of 
shareholder wealth.”  Green is Good, supra note 34, at 998.  
 68. See, e.g., Baron v. Strawbridge & Clothier, 646 F. Supp. 690, 697 (E.D. Pa. 
1986) (quoting Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678, 686 (E.D. Pa. 
1985)) (stating that, while it was proper for directors facing takeover attempts to 
consider corporation’s employees, customers, and community, their fiduciary duty 
was still “to act in the best interests of the corporation’s shareholders”).  Also, it is 
either expressly provided or generally understood that these nonshareholder 
constituencies do not have standing to sue on the basis that the directors failed to 
consider their interests, making it less likely that directors will be concerned about 
them. 
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mission-driven companies in constituency statute jurisdictions may 
be hesitant to “consider” their missions for fear of a fiduciary duty 
breach.69  In his article analyzing the current effects of Dodge v. Ford, 
Jonathan Macey argues that “if a CEO testifies that he and his 
board were engaging in certain actions for reasons unrelated to 
maximizing shareholder value, they would lose a lawsuit 
challenging those actions, especially if they exhibited indifference 
to the interests of those shareholders.”70  In eBay, Macey’s 
prediction rang eerily true: the eBay court admonished the 
defendants for failing to make “any serious attempt” to link 
craigslist’s purpose of protecting its culture to shareholder 
profitability—the directors paid the price.  The uncertainty 
surrounding corporate decision making that openly rejects 
shareholder wealth maximization makes it difficult for the directors 
of mission-driven companies to feel they are legally protected in 
considering the interests of constituencies other than the 
shareholders who have elected them.  Furthermore, as Macey 
points out, management is encouraged to lie, or at least to couch 
their actions in terms of long-term shareholder maximization.71  
For companies that may wish to advertise and openly rely upon 
their non-shareholder driven policies, there is clearly a risk 
associated with this position. 
Further, permissive constituency statutes only create the 
option (and not the requirement) for directors to consider 
interests of constituencies other than shareholders.  Thus, directors 
have the permission not to consider interests other than 
shareholder maximization of value.  Mission-driven executives and 
investors are often in minority shareholder positions and would 
prefer that directors and officers be required to consider these 
expanded interests when making decisions, with a shareholder 
right of action providing the “teeth” to enforce such consideration.  
This is particularly true in situations where a company is 
 
 69. Directors who have invoked constituency statutes have usually done so 
when sued for a breach of fiduciary duty in the course of defending against 
takeover attempts.  Constituency statutes are just one of many potential defenses 
that directors may use, and directors have been more likely to rely on anti-takeover 
mechanisms that have been proven in court and that do not call into question the 
directors’ fiduciary duties. 
 70. Macey, supra note 35, at 189. 
 71. Id. at 180–81 (“[I]t simply is not possible or practical for courts to discern 
ex post when a company is maximizing value for shareholders and when the officers 
and directors are only pretending to do so.”). 
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considering strategic alternatives and directors’ discretion in 
making business decisions is more limited by traditional principals 
requiring shareholder value maximization.72  Even in cases where 
the mission-driven decision makers are in the majority, as in eBay, 
duties owed to minority shareholders could thwart the efforts to 
maintain the long-term, mission-driven goals of the corporation. 
2. Non-Constituency States 
In non-constituency statute states, including Delaware, 
consideration of a public mission is even more problematic because 
under the corporate statutes of those states the directors are not 
expressly permitted to consider the interests of stakeholders or 
constituents other than shareholders in the discharge of their 
duties.73 
Delaware is the only U.S. state under which a majority of U.S. 
public companies, and numerous private companies, particularly 
those with or interested in attracting outside capital, are 
incorporated, due in significant part to its well-developed body of 
corporate law and its lack of a constituency statute.74  Although not 
statutory, Delaware has addressed the issue of consideration of 
other constituencies, but only in the context of takeovers, and even 
then courts still require a connection to shareholder value 
maximization.75  Unocal articulates that Delaware law permits 
directors to assess threats to the corporation by considering “the 
impact on . . . [its] creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps 
even the community generally,” with the apparent proviso that 
 
 72. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 
173, 182 (Del. 1986) (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 
955 (Del. 1985)) (stating that directors, faced with a hostile takeover bid for a 
corporation, may only consider various non-shareholder constituencies if “there 
are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.”). 
 73. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (2010) (stating that director must 
discharge his or her duties “in good faith, in a manner such director believes to be 
in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders and with such care, 
including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position 
would use under similar circumstances”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1541a (2009) 
(stating similarly that director must discharge his or her duties “[i]n good faith . . . 
[w]ith the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise 
under similar circumstances . . . [i]n a manner he or she reasonably believes to be 
in the best interests of the corporation”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30 (2010) (stating 
substantially the same as Michigan). 
 74. See Race to the Left, supra note 60, at 494. 
 75. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. 
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some benefit, however remote, must accrue to the shareholders.76  
Likewise, in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., the 
court states that directors, faced with a hostile takeover bid for a 
corporation, may only consider various non-shareholder 
constituencies if “there are rationally related benefits accruing to 
the stockholders.” 77  In eBay,78 as described above, the Delaware 
court recently reaffirmed its position and made clear that a mission 
that “seeks not to maximize the economic value . . . for the benefit 
of its stockholders” is an invalid corporate purpose and inconsistent 
with directors’ fiduciary duties.79 
Without a constituency statute, the interests of other 
constituencies may be considered at the directors’ own risk, and to 
pass muster would likely need to be tied to the long-term goal of 
shareholder value maximization.  This serves as a considerable limit 
for companies that wish to operate, advertise, and preserve a non-
shareholder driven mission or practice.  Consider, for example, a 
corporation that has a policy of supporting other sustainable 
businesses and thereby consistently rejects contracts and services 
from companies offering lower prices.  Over time, this practice may 
never result in the maximization of shareholder value.  In a 
scenario like this one, the laws of non-constituency states provide 
minimal protection. 
C. Levels of Scrutiny of Director Decisions 
It is important to note that, as a general matter, the level of 
scrutiny a court will give to the decisions of a director (in both 
constituency and non-constituency states) is dependent in part on 
the context in which the decision is being made.  To use Delaware 
as an example again because of its well-developed body of case law 
that is sometimes cited by other states in the absence of their own 
authority, Delaware courts review director decision-making in three 
broad categories, or scenarios: (1) day-to-day decisions, (2) 
defensive decisions,80 and (3) change of control decisions.81   
 
 76. Green is Good, supra note 34, at 998 n.52. 
 77. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. 
 78. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 79. Id. at 33; see id. (“Promoting, protecting, or pursuing nonstockholder 
considerations [with defensive measures] must lead at some point to value for 
stockholders.”). 
 80. Defensive decisions are those taken by directors in an effort to ward off 
potential bidders, whether friendly or hostile.  18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1477 
(2011). 
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In the day-to-day context, directors can consider non-
shareholder interests as long as they can show a rational 
connection between that consideration and shareholder value.82  
This is because courts review director decisions in the day-to-day 
context under the deferential “business judgment rule.”  In 
essence, the business judgment rule is a rebuttable presumption by 
courts that “in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation act on an informed basis, in good faith and in the 
honest belief that the action taken [is] in the best interest of the 
company.”83  In other words, courts reviewing decisions made in 
the day-to-day context will not question rational judgments about 
how seemingly promoting non-shareholder interests (such as a 
corporation’s decision to make charitable contributions or to 
otherwise support the community in which their operations are 
located) ultimately promote shareholder value.84 
Even in the day-to-day context in which directors enjoy most 
discretion, decisions must show a connection between that 
consideration and shareholder value.  While it is not true that all 
decisions that reflect consideration of non-shareholder interests 
lead to a reduction in shareholder value, and some in fact may lead 
to its increase, it is equally true that some might lead to reduced 
shareholder value, even over the long term.  Moreover, some 
mission-driven business executives and investors may be 
comfortable with that result in the pursuit of their social mission, 
whether that mission was reflected in providing below-market 
pricing of health insurance to the otherwise uninsured, accepting 
higher cost of production from overseas factories audited by a third 
party for their social and environmental standards, or focusing on 
smaller, less profitable market segments that seek “better” products 
or need basic services.  In this instance, the resolution of litigation 
 
 81. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180–83 (noting that a corporation’s board’s duty 
changes when it becomes obvious that the company is being bought by a third 
party).  Change of control decisions are those decisions taken by directors once it 
is clear that a company will be sold.  3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCER ET AL., FLETCHER 
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 1041.50 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2011). 
 82. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citing Kaplan v. 
Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971); Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Ref. 
Corp., 126 A. 46 (Del. Ch. 1924)) (stating that director’s decisions must be “on an 
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in 
the best interests of the company”). 
 83. Id. 
 84. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 33–34 (Del. Ch. 
2010). 
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by a shareholder seeking maximized financial return against the 
directors of such a mission-driven company, even under this level 
of scrutiny, would be uncertain at best from the perspective of the 
mission-driven company and its directors.  This uncertainty can 
have a chilling effect on the pursuit of the social mission. 
When defending takeover attempts, directors generally enjoy 
significantly less deference, as these decisions (including 
consideration of non-shareholder interests) on their face do not 
seem designed to maximize shareholder value.85  When directors 
act defensively, Delaware courts apply the standards set forth in 
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.86  Under Unocal, Delaware courts 
will give directors the benefit of the business judgment rule only if 
the directors can first demonstrate that they were responding to a 
legitimate threat to corporate policy and effectiveness, and, second, 
that their response was “reasonable in relation to the threat 
posed.”87  As applied in eBay, Chancellor Chandler found that 
under Unocal, a public-service mission was not a legitimate 
corporate policy, and thus taking defensive measures to protect 
that mission violates Unocal.88  The court stated: “Directors of a for-
profit Delaware corporation cannot deploy a [policy] to defend a 
business strategy that openly eschews stockholder wealth 
maximization—at least not consistently with the directors’ fiduciary 
duties under Delaware law.”89  While the facts of eBay are unique 
and a different company’s publicly-oriented mission may be 
considered a legitimate corporate policy, Chancellor Chandler’s 
language suggests that Delaware courts will seek to limit the “purely 
philanthropic ends” of mission-driven companies and require a 
connection of any stated purpose to shareholder value, especially 
when their directors’ decisions are reviewed under Unocal’s 
scrutiny.  
If defending takeover attempts severely restricts directors’ 
ability to consider non-shareholder interests, a corporate sale can 
 
 85. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 
1994) (subjecting to a higher standard of review for directors’ decision to launch 
defensive measures in response to a threat of control, and in transactions involving 
the sale of control); see also Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 330 (Del. 
Ch. 2000) (concluding that directors are afforded less deference in reviewing a 
defensive response to a takeover attempt). 
 86. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 87. Id. at 949, 955–56. 
 88. eBay, 16 A.3d at 32, 34. 
 89. Id. at 35. 
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eradicate any such ability in a non-constituency state.  A company 
goes “up for sale” when it initiates an active bidding process to sell 
itself or to reorganize itself in a way that will clearly break up the 
company, or when, in response to an active bidder’s offer, the 
company abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative 
transaction with a preferred party that will clearly break up the 
company.90  In any of these circumstances, Delaware and other 
state case law has made clear that the directors’ only duty is to 
maximize shareholder value by securing the highest bid reasonably 
available and that “concern for non-stockholder interests is 
inappropriate when an auction among active bidders is in 
progress.”91  These duties—the duty to maximize shareholder value 
and the corollary obligation to disregard all other considerations—
are referred to as “Revlon duties,” and originate from the landmark 
case Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.92  While 
skilled legal counsel can give directors guidance on how to attempt 
to avoid Revlon duties, there remains ambiguity about when Revlon 
duties are triggered.  That ambiguity frequently leads to Revlon-
based lawsuits. 
Some commentators have dismissed Revlon as an anomaly in 
Delaware law and belittled its impact with respect to mission-driven 
and triple-bottom-line businesses.93   
However, to ignore the impact of director duties in a sale 
situation is a glaring oversight.  This scenario, famously faced by 
the benevolent ice cream company Ben & Jerry’s, resulted in the 
company being sold to Unilever, the corporate giant that owns 
 
 90. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 
1990) (outlining two circumstances in which directors must consider maximizing 
shareholder value above any other consideration).  
 91. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 
(Del. 1986); see also Plaza Sec. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 643 F. Supp. 1535, 1543 (E.D. 
Mich. 1986) (citing Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182) (“In a contest for corporate control, 
when directors have determined that it is inevitable that the corporation be sold, . 
. . the directors’ cardinal fiduciary obligation to the corporation and its 
shareholders is to ensure ‘maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the 
stockholders’ benefit.’”). 
 92. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).  In Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 
the court extended Revlon duties to situations where, following a merger, the 
resulting entity is owned and controlled by a single shareholder.  See Paramount 
Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 36–41 (Del. 1993). 
 93. See, e.g., Race to the Left, supra note 60, at 498 n.29 (relegating discussion of 
the Revlon line of takeover cases to a footnote and stating that “the vast majority of 
green business decisions involve operational issues, not takeovers, and thus the 
Revlon line of cases, while interesting, should not apply”). 
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Breyers and Good Humor, in April of 2000.94  Ben Cohen, one of 
the founders, stated that he would have preferred for the company 
to remain independent.95  Mr. Mollner, founder of a socially 
responsible investment fund involved in an earlier bid to take the 
company private, explained: “‘The board felt they had no choice 
but to let all three [bidders] put their best offers on the table 
yesterday’ . . . ‘[w]e think it’s horrible that a company has no 
choice but to sell to the highest bidder or get sued.’”96  Although 
Ben & Jerry’s worked out a plan with Unilever to preserve many 
aspects of its corporate mission,97 other mission-driven companies 
may not have the same bargaining power to protect their own 
businesses. 
IV. BENEFIT CORPORATIONS 
It is against the paradigm of shareholder primacy that benefit 
corporation statutes have been drafted.  These statutes address not 
only the need for a new corporate form that changes the paradigm 
of shareholder primacy, but also respond to the demand from the 
market place for a corporate form that meets the needs and 
expectations of increasingly socially and environmentally conscious 
consumers, investors, and entrepreneurs.  The statutes vary in their 
details from state to state, but share major characteristics.  The 
following discussion refers to “benefit corporation legislation” as a 
way of referring generally to the common provisions that have been 
enacted in the states. 
There are three major provisions in benefit corporation 
legislation that are consistent from state to state.  These provisions 
address corporate purpose, accountability, and transparency.  A 
benefit corporation: (1) has the corporate purpose to create a 
material, positive impact on society and the environment; (2) 
expands fiduciary duty to require consideration of nonfinancial 
interests; and (3) reports on its overall social and environmental 
 
 94. Constance L. Hays, Ben & Jerry’s to Unilever, With Attitude, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
13, 2000, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/13/business/ben-
jerry-s-to-unilever-with-attitude.html?src=pm. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Unilever reportedly agreed to “commit 7.5 percent of Ben & Jerry’s 
profits to a foundation and agreed not to reduce jobs or alter the way the ice 
cream is made.”  Id.  Unilever also agreed to “contribute $5 million to the 
foundation, create a $5 million fund to help minority-owned businesses and others 
in poor neighborhoods and distribute $5 million to employees in six months.”  Id. 
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performance as assessed against a comprehensive, credible, 
independent, and transparent third-party standard.98 
A. Corporate Purpose: General Public Benefit  
Benefit corporations are required to have a purpose of creating 
“general public benefit” and are allowed to identify one or more 
“specific public benefit” purposes.99  This differs from general 
corporations, which are allowed to form for any lawful purpose, but 
have no explicit purpose requirement.100 
The most recently introduced benefit corporation legislation 
in California defines general public benefit as a “material positive 
impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole, as 
assessed against a third-party standard, from the business and 
operations of a benefit corporation.”101  This definition takes a 
holistic approach and is meant to be both comprehensive and 
flexible.  What is meant by general public benefit is significantly 
informed by two other provisions of the benefit corporation 
statutes: the redefined duties of directors and the differing 
treatment of general public benefit and specific public benefit. 
First, the statute redefines fiduciary duties.  The directors of 
benefit corporations, in considering the best interests of the 
corporation, 
[S]hall consider the effects of any action or decision not 
to act on: 
(i) The stockholders of the benefit corporation; 
(ii) The employees and workforce of the benefit 
corporation and the subsidiaries and suppliers of the 
benefit corporation; 
(iii) The interests of customers as beneficiaries of the 
 
 98. Benefit Corporation, supra note 9, at 1. 
 99. Id.; see also MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-06(a)(1)–(2), (b)(1) 
(2011). 
 100. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2011) (“A corporation may be 
incorporated or organized under this chapter to conduct or promote any lawful 
business or purposes, except as may otherwise be provided by the Constitution or 
other law of this State.”). 
 101. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(c) (West 2011); see also MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. 
& ASS’NS § 5-6C-01(b) (2011).  The Vermont statute adopts the same definition, 
see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03 (2010), while the New Jersey statute defines 
general public benefit as “a material positive impact on society and the 
environment by the operations of a benefit corporation through activities that 
promote some combination of specific public benefits.”  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1 
(West 2011). 
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general or specific public benefit purposes of the benefit 
corporation; 
(iv) Community and societal considerations, including 
those of any community in which offices or facilities of the 
benefit corporation or the subsidiaries or suppliers of the 
benefit corporation are located; and 
(v) The local and global environment . . . .102 
The stakeholder consideration mandate is an important 
distinguishing feature from the basic corporation statutes in 
“constituency” states discussed in Part III above; under 
“constituency” statutes, the consideration of non-shareholder 
interests is permissive, while under the benefit corporation statutes 
it is mandatory.103  By making these considerations mandatory, 
benefit corporations provide a framework for corporate 
responsibility that is both clear and lasting.  That the listed 
considerations are required helps to ensure that the general public 
benefit is being pursued and created, thus tying back to the 
purpose of the corporation.  The statute also allows directors to 
consider “any other pertinent factors . . . that the director 
determines are appropriate to consider.”104 
Furthermore, the statute explicitly states that “[t]he creation 
of a general public benefit or specific public benefit . . . is in the 
best interests of the benefit corporation.”105  This serves to protect 
against the presumption that the financial interests of the 
corporation take precedence over the public benefit purposes, 
which maximizes the benefit corporation’s flexibility in corporate 
 
 102. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-07(a)(1).  The Vermont Statute 
also requires the directors to consider “the long-term and short-term interests of 
the benefit corporation, including the possibility that those interests may be best 
served by the continued independence of the benefit corporation.”  VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 11A, § 21.09(a)(1)(F).  New Jersey has an added clause similar to Vermont.  See 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-6(a)(6). 
 103. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-07(a)(1).  Additionally, low-profit 
limited liability company (L3C) statutes do not address the scope of directors’ 
duties, stating simply that an L3C’s operating agreement may not “eliminate or 
reduce a member’s fiduciary duties” (though it may define what is or is not a 
breach of such duties).  See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180 / 15-5(6) (2011) (listing 
requirements for LLC operating agreements). 
 104. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-07(a)(2).  New Jersey and 
Vermont have similar provisions.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-6(b)(2); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 11A, § 21.09(a)(2). 
 105. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-06(c).  The New Jersey and 
Vermont statutes include similar provisions.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-5(c); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.08(c).  
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decision making.   
Second, the separate treatment of general public benefit and 
specific public benefit also informs what is distinctive about benefit 
corporations.  One of the main purposes of benefit corporation 
legislation is to create a voluntary new corporate form that has the 
corporate purpose to create benefits for society and the 
environment generally, as well as for the shareholders.  The 
entrepreneurs, investors, consumers, and policymakers interested 
in new corporate form legislation are not interested in, for 
example, reducing waste while increasing carbon emissions, or 
reducing both while remaining indifferent to the creation of 
economic opportunity for low-income individuals or underserved 
communities.  They are interested in creating a new corporate 
form that gives entrepreneurs and investors the flexibility and 
protection to pursue all of these or other public benefit purposes.  
The best way to give them what they need is to create a corporate 
form with a general public benefit purpose.  A company may also 
designate a specific public benefit, in addition to its general public 
benefit purpose.106  This ensures that a benefit corporation can 
pursue any specific mission, but that the company as a whole is also 
working toward general public benefit.  
The California statute lists seven non-exhaustive possibilities 
for specific public benefits, which are: 
(1) Providing low-income or underserved individuals or 
communities with beneficial products or services. 
(2) Promoting economic opportunity for individuals or 
communities beyond the creation of jobs in the ordinary 
course of business. 
(3) Preserving the environment. 
(4) Improving human health. 
(5) Promoting the arts, sciences, or advancement of 
knowledge. 
(6) Increasing the flow of capital to entities with a public 
benefit purpose. 
(7) The accomplishment of any other particular benefit 
for society or the environment.107 
 
 106. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.08(b) (providing that a benefit 
corporation may identify one or more specific public benefits). 
 107. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(e)(1)–(7) (West 2011); see also, e.g., MD. CODE 
ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-01(d) (listing specific public benefits); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 14A:18-1 (listing specific public benefits); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(6) 
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The need for general public benefit with an optional specific 
public benefit is best illustrated by example.  Suppose a 
corporation gives ninety-five percent of its profits to charity.  This 
fact, although commendable, does not provide the whole picture.  
If the corporation were to use the lowest costs of production (e.g., 
child labor), source raw materials from non-sustainable sources, 
dump hazardous waste, etc., it would be operating in a manner 
contrary to a benefit corporation.  On the other hand, a benefit 
corporation is not required to engage in or promote charitable 
activities (although it may designate such a specific purpose if it so 
chooses).  If the corporation consciously conducts its operations in 
a manner that is socially and environmentally responsible, it would 
qualify as a benefit corporation regardless of whether it also 
contributes to or promotes charitable causes. 
B. Transparency: Third-Party Standard and Overall Performance 
In the classic paradigm of shareholder primacy, the 
performance of the directors can be measured by the financial 
performance of the corporation as shown by its financial 
statements.  To permit monitoring of the performance of the 
directors of a benefit corporation, the statutes also require 
reporting on performance.108  Unlike in the financial area, where 
standardized conventions for reporting financial performance have 
developed, there does not yet exist a standard way to report on 
social and environmental performance.  Thus, the statutes permit 
benefit corporations to pick the standard that they will use. 
A benefit corporation is required to deliver an annual benefit 
report to the shareholders109 and to post it on its website so it is 
available to the public.110  Some states require filing the report with 
a department of the state.111  The report must include a narrative 
 
(listing specific public benefits).  The definition of specific public benefit is 
consistent across states, with only minor variations (i.e., New Jersey’s definition 
contains a slight variation in clause (1) which reads: “providing low income 
individuals or communities with beneficial products or services”).  N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 14A:18-1 (West 2011) (emphasis added). 
 108. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14(a)(2) (describing the required 
reporting on the social and environmental performance of a benefit corporation). 
 109. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-08(a); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
14A:18-11(c); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14(d). 
 110. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-08(c)(1).  
 111. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. § 14A:18-11(d); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1701–1709 
(Consol. 2011). 
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description of the ways in which the benefit corporation pursued a 
general public benefit and the extent to which it was created; the 
ways the benefit corporation pursued any specific benefit (if stated 
in the company’s articles) and the extent to which it was created; 
and any circumstances that may have hindered creation of either 
such benefit.112  In recently passed legislation in California and New 
York, the narrative description must also include the process and 
rationale for selecting the third-party standard.113 
In addition to disclosure requirements about the material 
shareholders of the benefit corporation and a statement of any 
connection of the benefit corporation to the third-party standard, 
the report must also include “[a]n assessment of the societal and 
environmental performance of the benefit corporation prepared in 
accordance with a third-party standard applied consistently with the 
prior year’s benefit report or accompanied by an explanation of 
the reasons for any inconsistent application.”114 
The definition of third-party standard has strengthened 
significantly since the introduction of the first benefit corporation 
statute in 2010.  Since in many ways the third-party standard is the 
heart of benefit corporation legislation, and for many observers, 
the most contentious and misunderstood provision in benefit 
corporation legislation, presented below is the full definition of 
third-party standard, and a full description of the reporting 
requirements for benefit corporations, for which the third-party 
standard is essential. 
Third-party standard is defined in California as “a standard for 
defining, reporting, and assessing overall corporate social and 
environmental performance,” which is: 
(1) . . . a comprehensive assessment of the impact of the 
business and the business’s operations upon the 
considerations listed in paragraphs (2) to (5) . . . . 
(2) . . . developed by an entity that has no material 
 
 112. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 5-6C-08(a)(1)(i)–(iii); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:18-11(a)(1)(a)–(c); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §§ 21.14(a)(1)(A)–
(C).  Vermont benefit corporations must additionally suggest specific actions the 
benefit corporation can take to improve upon the attainment of its identified 
goals.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14(a)(1)(D). 
 113. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14630(a)(1)(A) (West 2011); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 
1701–1709.  Additionally, in Vermont, shareholders must approve or reject the 
annual benefit report by majority vote.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A § 21.14 (c). 
 114. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-08(a)(2) (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
14A:18-11(a)(2) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14(a)(2) (2010).  
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financial relationship with the benefit corporation or any 
of its subsidiaries and satisfies both of the following 
requirements: 
(A) Not more than one-third of the members of the 
governing body of the entity are representatives of 
any of the following: 
(i) Associations of businesses operating in a 
specific industry, the performance of whose 
members is measured by the standard. 
(ii) Business from a specific industry or an 
association of businesses in that industry. 
(iii) Businesses whose performance is assessed 
against the standard. 
(B) The entity is not materially financed by an 
association or business described in subparagraph 
(A); 
(3) The standard is developed by an entity that does both 
of the following: 
(A) Accesses necessary and appropriate expertise to 
assess overall corporate social and environmental 
performance. 
(B) Uses a balanced multistakeholder approach, 
including a public comment period of at least 30 days 
to develop the standard. 
(4) All of the following information regarding the 
standard is publicly available: 
(A) The criteria considered when measuring the 
overall social and environmental performance of a 
business. 
(B) The relative weightings assigned to the criteria 
described in subparagraph (A). 
(C) The identity of the directors, officers, any 
material owners and the governing body of the entity 
that developed and controls revisions to the standard. 
(D) The process by which revisions to the standard 
and changes to the membership of the governing 
body described in subparagraph (C) are made. 
(E) An accounting of the sources of financial support 
for the entity, with sufficient detail to disclose any 
relationships that could reasonably be considered to 
28
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present a potential conflict of interest.115 
By assessing and disclosing the benefit corporation’s overall 
social and environmental performance against an independent 
third-party standard, shareholders and the public are provided an 
easy way to evaluate the company on these criteria, which for 
typical companies is otherwise almost impossible to determine.  
Based upon the research cited in Part II, it is anticipated that this 
simplified “due diligence” tool will facilitate greater investment in 
benefit corporations and improve customer loyalty by enabling 
people to differentiate good deeds from merely good marketing.  
Over time, this has the potential to create market-driven positive 
feedback loops rewarding companies that adopt this higher 
standard of corporate governance and demonstrate higher levels of 
overall social and environmental performance. 
1. Importance of Third-Party Standards 
The requirement that the annual benefit report assess the 
overall social and environmental performance of the benefit 
corporation against a third-party standard is an essential 
requirement of the benefit corporation legislation.  Below is a 
discussion of important issues relating to the third-party standard 
requirement. 
a. Choice of Third-Party Standard  
Benefit corporation legislation does not require a benefit 
corporation to use any particular third-party standard to prepare its 
benefit report so long as the standard chosen meets the statutory 
requirements.116  The definition of third-party standard was 
developed based on research into the criteria used by international 
standards organizations (e.g., American National Standards 
Institute, International Standards Organization, ISEAL) and 
regulatory bodies (e.g., Federal Trade Commission) to identify 
high quality standards and certifications.117 
There are many third party standards organizations that 
 
 115. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14600(g). 
 116. Benefit Corporation, supra note 9, at 2. 
 117. See, e.g., Uniting Education and Industry, AUTONOMOUS UNDERSEA SYS. INST., 
http://www.ausi.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2011) (AUSI is a not-for-profit 
organization that oversees the creation, promulgation, and use of norms and 
guidelines for businesses in a range of industries).  
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meet the statutory criteria for a third party standard [to be 
comprehensive, credible, independent, and 
transparent]. . . .  The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), 
GreenSeal, Underwriters Laboratories (UL), ISO2600, 
Green America, and B Lab are a few well-known 
examples. . . .  Both GRI and B Lab offer companies the 
use of their reporting (GRI) and assessment (B Lab) tools 
for free . . . .  In addition to the examples listed above, 
more than 100 ‘raters’ of corporate sustainability practices 
are listed in the free ‘Rate the Raters’ report published by 
the research and consulting firm SustainAbility. . . .  The 
management, and ultimately directors and shareholders, 
of benefit corporations are free to decide for themselves 
which of these or other standards they feel meet the 
statutory requirements and their needs.118 
To guard against “greenwashing,” the disclosure requirements 
of the annual benefit report with respect to the third-party standard 
require the corporation to explain how and why it chose a 
particular standard.119  The robustness of the assessment and the 
information included in the benefit report will provide further 
information and the standard to shareholders.  Furthermore, 
benefit corporation legislation provides management, directors, 
shareholders, and ultimately judges, criteria for what constitutes an 
acceptable third-party standard.120  Presumably, armed with the 
information included in the annual benefit report and the 
statutory requirements with respect to a third-party standard, 
market forces will shape the landscape of third-party standards 
utilized by benefit corporations.   
b. Verification of Third-Party Standard 
Benefit corporations are not required to have their benefit 
report certified or audited by a third party.  Mandatory verification 
was purposely omitted from the requirements for an acceptable 
third-party standard for several reasons.   
First, mandatory verification would place a cost burden on 
benefit corporations to meet the reporting requirements of the 
statute.  While free third-party standards exist that can be used to 
 
 118. Benefit Corporation, supra note 9, at 2. 
 119. Id. at 4. 
 120. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-08 (West 2010); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 14A:18-11 (West 2011). 
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generate a benefit report, no third-party standard will perform 
verification services for free.  Requiring a significant annual 
verification cost would greatly reduce adoption, particularly among 
the small businesses most interested in new corporate form 
legislation.  Second, ordinary corporations are not required to have 
audited financial reports and benefit corporations should not be 
required to have audited benefit reports of their social and 
environmental performance.  Third, directors of benefit 
corporations are already subject to litigation for fraud if they report 
false or intentionally misleading information in their benefit 
report, which serves as a sufficient incentive to provide complete 
and accurate benefit reports.  Finally, verification can and will 
become a means by which certain benefit corporations voluntarily 
distinguish themselves on a competitive basis to attract greater 
confidence in their claims of environmental and social 
performance. 
c. Independence 
The definition of “independent” plays a key role in assuring 
the reliability of the third-party standard, and the assessment of the 
benefit corporation’s social and environmental performance.  
Independence is vetted based on criteria regarding governance, 
transparency, and reporting. 
First, regarding governance, to ensure a balanced approach to 
the weighting, evolution, and application of the standard, no 
industry group, trade association, or individual interests assessed by 
the third-party standard can represent more than one-third of the 
controlling interest of the governing body of the standard.121  
Second, regarding transparency, to ensure that potential financial 
influence is disclosed, an accounting of the sources of financial 
support for the standard organization, including but not limited to 
fees, grants, investments, and material in-kind support, with 
sufficient detail to disclose any relationships that could reasonably 
be considered to present a potential conflict of interest, must be 
made publicly available.122  Third, regarding reporting, the benefit 
corporation is required to include in its annual benefit report a 
 
 121. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(g)(2) (West 2011). 
 122. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11(a)(5) (requiring reporting of each 
shareholder owning more than “5% or more of the outstanding shares of the 
benefit corporation”). 
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statement of any connection to the third-party standard, or its 
directors, officers, or material owners from the benefit corporation, 
or its directors, officers, and material owners, including any 
financial or governance relationship that might materially affect 
the credibility of the objective assessment of the third-party 
standard.123 
C. Scope of Director Liability 
Directors of benefit corporations are afforded certain 
protections under benefit corporation statutes.124  First, the statutes 
expressly state that the consideration of all stakeholders shall not 
constitute a violation of the general standards for directors, which 
requires good faith, the care of an ordinarily prudent person, and 
the consideration of the best interests of the corporation.125  
Second, in an effort to restrict potential liability, the most recent 
benefit corporation legislation in California specifically excludes 
director, officer, and corporate liability for monetary damages.126  
This decision was driven by twin desires to (1) eliminate such 
concern in the face of a lack of court precedent by which such 
 
 123. Id. § 14A:18-11(a)(3)–(5). 
 124. Some states have incorporated benefit director provisions into their 
benefit corporation legislation.  In other states, the benefit director’s duties are 
shared by the entire board.  In those states that have adopted benefit director 
provisions, a “benefit director” is a director who is specifically designated to 
oversee benefit issues. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1 (“‘Benefit director’ 
means the director designated as the benefit director of a benefit corporation.”); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(2) (2011) (“‘Benefit director’ means the 
director designated as the benefit director of a benefit corporation.”).  This 
director is responsible for preparing the annual benefit report and making a 
statement of whether, in the opinion of the benefit director, the benefit 
corporation acted in accordance with its general public benefit purpose and any 
specific benefit purpose.  See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-7(c) (“The benefit 
director shall prepare, and the benefit corporation shall include in the annual 
benefit report to shareholders . . . a statement whether, in the opinion of the 
benefit director, the benefit corporation acted in accordance with its general, and 
any specific, public benefit purpose in all material respects during the period 
covered by the report . . . .”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.10 (defining the duties 
of a benefit director more specifically).  The benefit director is subject to the same 
liability as other directors of a benefit corporation, as described in this section. 
 125. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-07(c) (referencing 
general standards for director conduct under MD. CODE ANN., CORPS  & ASS’NS § 2-
405.1); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-6(b)(1) (referencing general standard under N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09(b) (referencing general 
standard of care under VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 8.30). 
 126. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14620(e)(3). 
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liability could be quantified, and (2) to focus courts on the 
exclusive remedy of awarding injunctive relief wherein the benefit 
corporation would be required to simply live up to the 
commitments it voluntarily undertook.127 
Directors are also protected from lawsuits by beneficiaries of 
the corporation’s public benefit purpose.  Benefit corporation 
legislation clearly provides no right of action for third parties.128  
The statute explicitly does not create a fiduciary duty to anyone 
who cannot bring a “benefit enforcement proceeding.”129  Benefit 
enforcement proceedings are defined as actions brought on the 
grounds of a public benefit purpose, and the statute creates a right 
of action only for shareholders, directors, investors with a specified 
percentage interest (usually five to ten percent depending on the 
state) in the parent company, and other persons as specified in the 
company’s articles of incorporation.130 
However, notwithstanding the above, a shareholder is 
expressly given the right to bring a legal action on the basis that the 
director failed to pursue the stated general or specific public 
 
 127. The California, New Jersey, and Vermont statutes also make clear that, 
unless expressly provided in the company’s articles of incorporation, the directors 
are not required to give priority to the interests of any particular person or group 
referred to in the statute over any other person or group.  CAL. CORP. CODE § 
14620(d); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-6(c); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09(a)(3).  
The Vermont statute further provides that a director shall not be subject to a 
different or higher standard of care in a potential change of control situation 
(e.g., the Unocal or Revlon situations discussed in Part II above).  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
11A, § 21.09(a)(4).  The New Jersey and Vermont statutes also make clear that a 
director will not be liable for the failure to actually create a general or specific 
public benefit.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-6(d); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09(c).  
 128. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.13(a)–(b). 
 129. E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09(e) (“A director of a benefit 
corporation shall have a fiduciary duty only to those persons entitled to bring a 
benefit enforcement proceeding against the benefit corporation . . . .  A director 
of a benefit corporation shall not have any fiduciary duty to a person who is a 
beneficiary of the general or specific public benefit purposes of the benefit 
corporation arising only from the person’s status as a beneficiary.”); see also MD. 
CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-07(b) (“[Directors] do[] not have any duty to a 
person that is a beneficiary of the public benefit purposes of the benefit 
corporation.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-10(a)–(b) (stating that duties of directors 
can only be enforced in “benefit enforcement proceedings” initiated by the 
corporation, shareholders, directors, certain beneficial owners, or others 
authorized to so in the articles of incorporation or bylaws).  
 130. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-10(b) (enumerating who can commence or 
maintain a benefit enforcement proceeding); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.13(b) 
(listing only specific persons such as a director of a corporation who can 
commence or maintain a benefit enforcement proceeding). 
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benefits, failed to consider the interests of the various stakeholders 
set forth in the statute, or failed to meet the transparency 
requirements in the statute.131  While a shareholder of a benefit 
corporation could still bring a traditional action for the failure of 
the directors to adequately consider shareholder financial interests, 
such a shareholder could also now bring an action for failure to 
consider other stakeholder interests (e.g., for failure of the 
directors to adequately consider the impact of a particular action 
on the workforce of the company).  For the reasons stated in Part 
II,132 this expanded accountability to shareholders is specifically 
desired by most of the mission-driven entrepreneurs and investors 
interested in new corporate form legislation.  However, while this 
grants shareholders an expanded right of action, it is important to 
note that the consideration standard does not require a particular 
outcome of the directors’ decision making, but rather that there is a 
decision-making process that considers all of the enumerated 
stakeholders.133  Similarly, the exclusion of any right of action by 
third parties protects the benefit corporation from unknown, 
expanded liability that would otherwise operate as a disincentive to 
becoming a benefit corporation. 
Also, although a benefit enforcement proceeding is a viable 
enforcement option, lawyers advising shareholders of benefit 
corporations should focus on issues of corporate control, 
recognizing that the main policing mechanism for the 
performance of directors is the right of the shareholders to elect 
the directors.  The purpose of the expanded director 
considerations is to ensure that the corporation can and will pursue 
general public benefit, providing flexibility in director decision 
making to ensure that the corporation acts as a good citizen, and 
not merely a good profit-maker; however, there is a risk of director 
abuse.  Thus, care should be taken to make sure the election 
process in a benefit corporation remains robust so that the 
directors cannot abuse the flexibility inherent in the benefit 
corporation form. 
 
 131. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-10(b)(2)(a); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 
21.13(b)(1). 
 132. See supra Part II.B–C. 
 133. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09 (setting forth the standards of 
conduct for directors of benefit corporations).  
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V. CONCLUSION 
The sustainable business movement, impact investing, and 
social enterprise sectors are developing rapidly, but are constrained 
by an outdated legal framework that is not equipped to 
accommodate for-profit entities whose social benefit purpose is 
central to their existence.  The benefit corporation, which has 
already been established by statute in seven states and is the subject 
of legislative initiatives in three others, is the most comprehensive, 
yet flexible legal entity devised to address the needs of 
entrepreneurs and investors, and ultimately, the general public. 
Benefit corporation legislation differs from other attempts to 
“green” the corporate code—such as the passage of constituency 
statutes—because it creates a mandatory requirement for a 
corporation to pursue general public benefit.  Instead of trying to 
fit mission-driven companies into the traditional corporate 
framework based on shareholder primacy, benefit corporation 
legislation tweaks a familiar corporate form to address, in a 
meaningful way, the specific demands of shareholders and 
investors who desire transparency and accountability with respect 
to these businesses.  As a result, benefit corporations have also 
attracted the support of most of the entrepreneurs, investors, 
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